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IS COMPETITION ALWAYS GOOD?
Maurice E. Stucke *
INTRODUCTION
Americans love to compete. More Americans strongly agreed than any
other surveyed country’s residents that they like situations where they
compete. 1 Praised in various contexts, including warfare 2 and sororities,3
competition is the backbone of U.S. economic policy. The U.S. Supreme
Court observed, “The heart of our national economic policy long has been
faith in the value of competition.” 4 The belief in competition is not only
*

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Senior Fellow,
American Antitrust Institute. I wish to thank for their helpful comments the participants at
Oxford University’s Antitrust Enforcement Symposium and the Midwest Law and
Economics Association’s Annual Meeting, Caron Beaton-Wells, Kenneth M. Davidson,
John Davies, Harry First, Jochen Meulman, and <**>. I also thank the University of
Tennessee College of Law for the summer research grant.
1
Flash Eurobarometer, Entrepreneurship in the EU and beyond, Flash EB Series #283,
at 11 (May 2010) (American respondents “were more likely than EU citizens and Chinese
respondents to say they were risk-takers and liked competition (77%-82%); in comparison,
the proportions for EU citizens were 55%-65% and for Chinese respondents, 65%-69%”);
see also ibid 88 (“Respondents in the US most frequently agreed that they liked situations
in which they competed with others (77%, in total, agreed and 41% ‘strongly agreed’)).”
2
George S Patton (“Battle is the most magnificent competition in which a human
being can indulge. It brings out all that is best; it removes all that is base.”),
www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/competition.html#rO8a5rPy6AQBSh8C.99.
3
Abigail Sullivan Moore, ‘Education Life--Pledge Prep’ N.Y. Times (16 July 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/education/edlife/prepping-students-for-sororityrush.html?adxnnl=1&ref=edlife&adxnnlx=1348704410-R+EbnSirOXRCjIZgMV9Xbg
(describing the “relentless competition” to enter the desired college sorority).
4
Standard Oil Co v FTC 340 US 231, 248 (1951); see also Antitrust Modernization
Commission,
Report
and
Recommendations
(Apr.
2007)
2,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm
(“free-market
competition is, and has long been, the fundamental economic policy of the United States”);
Report to the President and the Attorney General of the National Commission for the
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (1979) 177 [hereinafter 1979 Antitrust Report];
The Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955) 1 (“Most
Americans have long recognized that opportunity for free market access and fostering of
market rivalry are basic tenets of our faith in competition as a form of economic
organization.”) [hereinafter 1955 Antitrust Report]; see also European Commission,
Competition, in Glossary of Terms Used in EU Competition Policy: Antitrust and Control
of Concentrations (July 2002) (describing “[f]air and undistorted competition” as “a
cornerstone of a market economy”).
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embodied in the antitrust laws. Every U.S. executive agency, for example,
is legally required to have an advocate for competition. 5
Competition advocacy is thriving internationally. 6

The past twenty

years witnessed more countries with antitrust laws and the birth and growth
of the International Competition Network (ICN), an international
organization of governmental competition authorities, with over 100
member countries. China viewed, until the late 1970s, the term competition
pejoratively as a “capitalist monster.” 7 Now China, Russia, and India have
competition laws.

Although different constituencies accept to different

degrees the benefits of competition and competition policy, the strongest
supporters for competition advocacy, in an ICN survey, were among the
academic community, consumer associations, media, and non-governmental
organizations. 8

“Within OECD countries, competition is now broadly

accepted as the best available mechanism for maximising the things that one
can demand from an economic system in most circumstances.” 9
Promoting competition is, of course, the central tenet of America’s
antitrust laws:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
5

The agency’s advocate for competition is responsible for, inter alia, “challenging
barriers to, and promoting full and open competition in, the procurement of property and
services by the executive agency” and identifying “opportunities and actions taken to
achieve full and open competition in the procurement activities of the executive agency.”
41 USC § 1705.
6
World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets
(2002) 133; Paul Crampton, Head, Outreach Unit, Competition Division, OECD,
‘Competition and Efficiency as Organising Principles for All Economic and Regulatory
Policymaking’, Prepared for the First Meeting of the Latin American Competition Forum
(7-8 April 2003) 2 (advocating “competition and efficiency [as the] policy ‘glue’ that links
and binds all economic and regulatory decision-making into a coherent framework”).
7
Xiaoye Wang, ‘The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in
Progress’ (2009) 54 Antitrust Bull 579, 580.
8
International Competition Network, Advocacy and Competition Policy--Report
prepared by the Advocacy Working Group, for the ICN’s Conference Naples, Italy, 2002
(2002) xi.
9
Crampton, supra note, at 3.
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economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conductive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions. But even were that
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by
the Act is competition. 10
Competition

officials

regularly

try

to

protect

the

public

from

anticompetitive special interest legislation. 11 They are justifiably jaded
about complaints of excessive competition. As one court observed,
“Entertaining claims of excessive competition would undermine the
functions of the antitrust laws.” 12 This is especially relevant in an economic
crisis, when competition is an attractive target.

A U.S. Department of

Justice (DOJ) official observed:
These days, it is unlikely that well-counseled firms will explicitly
argue that they need to be saved from “ruinous” or “cutthroat”
competition. But, under one name or another, this idea is likely to
resurface. For example, two merging firms may well argue that
ongoing competition will leave them with insufficient profits to
make valuable and necessary investments to serve consumers. This
is effectively a version of the “ruinous competition” argument that

10

N Pac Ry Co v US 356 US 1, 4 (1958).
Advocacy Working Group, Int’l Competition Network, ‘Advocacy Toolkit Part I:
Advocacy Process and Tools,’ presented at the 10th Annual Conference of the ICN, The
Hague (May 2011) 5, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/workinggroups/current/advocacy.aspx (“When they engage in competition advocacy, competition
agencies may aim to [1] persuade other public authorities not to adopt unnecessarily
anticompetitive measures and help them clearly to delineate the boundaries of economic
regulation [2] increase awareness of the benefits of competition, and of the role
competition law and policy can play in promoting and protecting welfare enhancing
competition wherever possible, among economic agents, public authorities, the judicial
system and the public at large.”).
12
Stamatakis Indus, Inc v King 965 F 2d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Edward A
Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, ‘Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff’
(1991) 90 Mich L Rev 551.
11
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should be treated skeptically. 13
Although the economic crisis has prompted some policymakers to
reconsider basic assumptions, the virtues of competition are not among
them:
While antitrust analysis needs to take account of all applicable
regulations, it unabashedly embraces the virtues of competition as
a method of allocating resources, given those regulations. The
current crisis provides no basis for wavering from this core
principle, which has enjoyed bipartisan support since the Sherman
Act was passed in 1890. 14
Nonetheless to effectively advocate competition, officials must understand
when competition itself is the cause, not the remedy, of the problem.
Market competition, while harming some participants, often benefits
society. 15 But does competition always benefit society? This is antitrust’s
blind spot.
Part I outlines the virtues of competition. Part II discusses some wellaccepted exceptions to competition law. Part III addresses four scenarios
where competition yields a suboptimal result.
I. THE VIRTUES OF COMPETITION
Among competition’s many virtues, the Supreme Court observed, is
“that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market

13

Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Div., Competition Policy In Distressed Industries, Remarks Prepared for ABA Antitrust
Symposium:
Competition
as
Public
Policy
(13
May
2009)
9,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm; see also Joaquín Almunia, Vice
President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, ‘Competition
Policy
as
a
Pan-European
Effort’
(2
Oct
2012)
SPEECH/12/672,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/672.
14
Shapiro, supra note, at 2.
15
Composite Marine Propellers, Inc v Van Der Woude 962 F 2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir.
1992) (“Competition is ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving-and a boon to
society, Adam Smith reminds us, precisely because of these qualities that make it a bane to
other producers.”).
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recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and
durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers.” 16 Competition can yield
•

lower costs and prices for goods and services,

•

better quality,

•

more choices,

•

more innovation,

•

greater efficiency and productivity,

•

economic development and growth,

•

greater wealth equality,

•

a stronger democracy by dispersing economic power, and

•

greater wellbeing by promoting individual initiative, liberty, and
free association. 17

These virtues are so ingrained within the antitrust community that
competition often takes a religious quality.

The Ordoliberal, Austrian,

Chicago, post-Chicago, Harvard, and Populist schools, for example, can
disagree over how competition plays outs in markets, the proper antitrust
goals, and the legal standards to effectuate the goals. But they unabashedly
agree that competition itself is good. Antitrust policies and enforcement

16

Nat'l Soc of Prof'l Engineers v US 435 US 679, 695 (1978).
AMC Report, supra note, at 2-3; World Bank, World Development Report 2002:
Building Institutions for Markets (2002) 133; David J Gerber, Law and Competition in
Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1998) 242-45; 1979 Antitrust Report,
supra note, at 178-79; 1955 Antitrust Report, supra note, at 1-2, 317-18; William J
Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div, ‘The Role
of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth’ (12 Nov. 2002),
2002 WL 34170825 (D.O.J.) (“The competition for capital and other resources by firms
throughout the economy leads to money and resources flowing away from weak,
uncompetitive sectors and firms and towards the strongest, most competitive sectors, and to
the strongest and most competitive firms within those sectors. In these ways, the very
operation of the competitive process makes decisions on restructuring clear, and leads to
the strongest and most competitive economy possible.”).
17
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priorities can change with incoming administrations. But one continuum at
the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is targeting horizontal
restraints and erection of entry barriers via legislation. 18 Competition
authorities from around the world may disagree over substantive and
procedural issues, but they all advocate competition. 19 Indeed the labels
pro-competitive and anticompetitive are synonymous with socially
beneficial and detrimental conduct.
Some policies that seemingly restrict competition are justified for
promoting competition.

Intellectual property rights, for example, can

restrict competition along some dimensions (such as the use of a trade
name). But the belief is that intellectual property and antitrust policies,
rather than conflict, complement one another in promoting innovation and
competition. 20 Likewise, contractual non-compete clauses are justified for
their pro-competitive benefits. 21
18

James C Cooper et al, ‘Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC’
(2005) 72 Antitrust LJ 1091, 1093 n6 (charting the shifts in the number of FTC advocacy
filings between 1980-2004).
19
Advocacy Working Group, Int’l Competition Network, ‘Advocacy and Competition
Policy
Report’
(2002)
25,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/OutreachToolkit/media/
assets/resources/advocacy_report.pdf (adopting the following definition of competition
advocacy: “Competition advocacy refers to those activities conducted by the competition
authority related to the promotion of a competitive environment for economic activities by
means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its relationship with other
governmental entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition”).
20
US Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, ‘Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition’ (2007) 1, 2,
www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm (“intellectual property law's grant of
exclusivity was seen as creating monopolies that were in tension with antitrust law's attack
on monopoly power. Such generalizations are relegated to the past. Modern understanding
of these two disciplines is that intellectual property and antitrust laws work in tandem to
bring new and better technologies, products, and services to consumers at lower prices. . . .
Both spur competition among rivals to be the first to enter the marketplace with a desirable
technology, product, or service.”).
21
Lektro-Vend Corp v Vendo Co 660 F 2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1981) (“The recognized
benefits of reasonably enforced noncompetition covenants are by now beyond question.”);
US v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co 85 F 271, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175
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Given their faith in competition’s healing powers, antitrust officials
typically distrust complaints about competition. They are rightfully wary
when industry groups decry competition as ruinous or destructive or other
government agencies restrain or bar competition. 22 First, consumers can
pay more for poorer quality products or services, and have fewer choices.
Second, governmental or private restraints can impede entry, raise exit
costs, and inhibit innovation. Third, economic regulation attracts special
interest groups to lobby for regulations that benefit them to society’s
detriment. Competitors, challenged by new rivals or new forms of
competition, may turn to regulators for help.

Competitors may ask

governmental agencies under the guise of consumer protection to prohibit
or restrict certain pro-competitive activity, such as allowing professionals to
offer discounts to their clients. They may enlist the government to increase
trade barriers or for other protectionist measures. Such “rent-seeking”
behavior benefits lobbyists and lawyers, but can substantially waste scarce
resources. Finally, impeding competition can cause significant antidemocratic outcomes, like concentrated economic and political power,
political instability, and corruption. 23
Accordingly antitrust officials are justly suspicious when regulatory
bodies decide that a company’s entry would “tend to a destructive
competition in markets already adequately served and would not be in the
public interest.” 24 Such decisions are best left to consumers, not regulators.
US 211 (1899).
22
See, eg, US v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co 310 US 150, 220-21 (1940) (“Ruinous
competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting and the like appear throughout our
history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing.”); Addyston Pipe & Steel, 175 US at
213-14 (defendants defending their bid rigging “for the purpose of avoiding the great losses
they would otherwise sustain, due to ruinous competition”).
23
Daron Acemoglu & James A Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty (2012) 3-4; World Bank, supra note, at 135.
24
Farmland Dairies v Comm’r of New York State Dept of Agric & Markets 650 F
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II. COMPETITION SACRIFICED
As Part I discusses, competition, given its virtues, is the heart of U.S.
economic policy. But competition, while often praised, is also criticized. 25
One economic reality, as this Part outlines, is that competition and antitrust
law do not permeate all social and economic activity.
A. Activity Not Subject to Competition
Life would be more stressful if we competed for everything.
Competition cannot always be preferred over cooperation. Cooperation is
often more appealing and socially rewarding. 26 Society and competitors at
times benefit when rivals cooperate in joint ventures and addressing societal
needs (such as supporting education for specific trades).

The divide

between cooperation and competition is beyond this Article’s scope. 27 But
one important issue is when competition makes people less cooperative,
promotes selfishness and free-riding, reduces contributions to public goods,
and leaves society worse off. 28
Supp 939, 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Commissioner’s Determination, State of New
York Department of Agriculture and Markets 21 (11 Dec. 1986)).
25
See, eg, Blankenship v Lewis County Fiscal Court CIV.A. 06-147-EBA, 2007 WL
4404165 (E.D. Ky. 17 Dec. 2007) (county government denying plaintiff permit to collect
and haul away residents’ waste “on the grounds that permitting additional waste hauling
businesses to operate in Lewis County would create too much competition for the existing
seven businesses providing that service to the community”).
26
Jean Decety et al, ‘The Neural Bases of Cooperation and Competition: an fMRI
Investigation’ (2004) 23 NeuroImage 744, 749 (finding that while cooperation and
competition activated the frontoparietal network and anterior insula, “distinct regions were
found to be selectively associated with cooperation and competition, notably the
orbitofrontal cortex in the former and the inferior parietal and medial prefrontal cortices in
the latter.”).
27
Saul Levmore, ‘Competition and Cooperation’ (1998) 97 Michigan L Rev 216.
28
Stefania Ottone & Ferruccio Ponzano, ‘Competition and Cooperation in Markets:
The Experimental Case of a Winner-take-all Setting’ (2010) 39 J of Socio-Economics 163,
169-70 (finding that in winner-take-all scenario where subjects with homogeneous skills
meet more than once stimulates greater cooperation than subjects in a perfect competition
scenario); Claudia Canegallo et al, ‘Competition Versus Cooperation: Some Experimental
Evidence’ (2008) 37 J of Socio-Economics 18, 24-25 (finding “the presence and the degree
of competition in the economic environment significantly affect the willingness of
individuals to cooperate, in a negative relation”).
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Social and religious norms exclude or curtail competition in many daily
settings. Commuting to work, in theory, is not a competitive sport. Parents
should not foster competition among their children for their affection. 29
None of the pleasurable daily or weekly activities (ie, intimate relations,
socializing after work, relaxing, dinner, lunch, praying/worship) necessarily
implicate competition. 30 Parishioners are discouraged from competing for
better pews and parking spaces. Nor do the mainstream religions endorse a
deity who wants people to compete for His love.
Competition norms do not translate easily in these social or religious
settings. For example, if private companies agree to not cold call each
other’s employees for employment opportunities, they face antitrust
liability. 31 Some religions arguably compete for new members. 32 But it is
doubtful that religious leaders are liable for agreeing not to proselytize each
other’s members and to share information to enforce such agreements. 33
29

The American Academy of Pediatrics, Caring for Your School-Age Child: Ages 5 to
12 (Bantam 1999) 367-72.
30
Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, ‘Development in the Measurement of
Subjective Well-Being’ (2006) 20 J of Economic Perspectives 3, 13.
31
Compl., US v Adobe Systems, Inc Civ. Act. No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C filed 24
Sept. 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f262600/262650.htm.
32
Daniel M Hungerman, ‘Rethinking the Study of Religious Markets’ in The Oxford
Handbook of the Economics of Religion, edited by Rachel McCleary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 257-275.
33
Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman
Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church VIIth Plenary Session, Balamand School of
Theology
(Lebanon)
(17-24
June
1993),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_
chrstuni_doc_19930624_lebanon_en.html (“Pastoral activity in the Catholic Church, Latin
as well as Oriental, no longer aims at having the faithful of one Church pass over to the
other; that is to say, it no longer aims at proselytizing among the Orthodox. It aims at
answering the spiritual needs of its own faithful and it has no desire for expansion at the
expense of the Orthodox Church. Within these perspectives, so that there will be no longer
place for mistrust and suspicion, it is necessary that there be reciprocal exchanges of
information about various pastoral projects and that thus cooperation between bishops and
all those with responsibilities in our Churches, can be set in motion and develop.”), but see
Barak D Richman, ‘Saving the First Amendment from Itself: Relief from the Sherman Act
Against the Rabbinic Cartels’ (April 21, 2012) Pepperdine L Rev, Forthcoming, available
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Some goods and services are not subject to market competition. 34
Although a market may otherwise form between willing buyers and sellers,
the country’s laws and informal norms prevent these markets’ formation or
curtail the competition therein. One example is human organs. Among the
concerns economist Alvin Roth identifies are (i) objectification--pricing a
thing or service moves it into a class of impersonal objects to which it does
not belong (eg, payment for organs transforms a good deed (donating one’s
organs) into a bad one (marketing and selling one’s organs that violates
human dignity)); (ii) coercion--giving money “might leave some people,
particularly the poor, open to exploitation from which they deserve
protection”; and (iii) the slippery slope--monetizing transactions “may
cause society to slide down a slippery slope to genuinely repugnant
transactions” (eg, lenders use organs as collateral for debts, and opens up
sale of body parts generally (including eyes, arms, legs, etc.)). 35
This is not fixed.

Markets once considered repugnant (eg, lending

money for interest, life insurance for adults) are no longer. Markets that are
repugnant today (eg, slavery), once were not.
B. Antitrust Immunities
The U.S. antitrust laws apply across most industries and to nearly all
forms of business organizations. But the Court noted:
Surely it cannot be said . . . that competition is of itself a national
policy. To do so would disregard not only those areas of economic
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808005 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1808005
(discussing antitrust challenge of the Conservative Judaism movement’s rules governing
the rabbi hiring process).
34
Alvin E Roth, ‘Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets’ (2007) 21 J of Economic
Perspectives 37-58; Michael J Sandel, ‘What Isn’t for Sale’ The Atlantic (April 2002),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/04/what-isnt-for-sale/308902/.
35
Roth, supra note, at 44-45; Dan Bilefsky, ‘European Crisis Bolsters Illegal Sales of
Body
Parts’
N.Y.
Times
(1
June
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/europe/european-crisis-bolsters-illegal-salesof-body-parts.html?pagewanted=all.
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activity so long committed to government monopoly as no longer
to be thought open to competition, such as the post office, cf., e.g.,
17 Stat. 292 (criminal offense to establish unauthorized post office;
provision since superseded), and those areas, loosely spoken of as
natural monopolies or-more broadly-public utilities, in which
active regulation has been found necessary to compensate for the
inability of competition to provide adequate regulation. It would
most strikingly disregard areas where policy has shifted from one
of prohibiting restraints on competition to one of providing relief
from the rigors of competition, as has been true of railroads. 36
Some or all economic activity in various industries is expressly
immunized from antitrust liability. 37 Other significant areas of the economy
are subject to implied antitrust immunity. The Court’s state action doctrine,
for example, reflects the realities of state and local governments’ displacing
competition for other aims. 38
C. Noncommercial Activities Intended to Promote Social Causes
Economic activity, even if not immunized, may fall outside the scope of
the antitrust law. Although Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply to
commercial activity, its legislative history “reveals that it was not intended
to reach noncommercial activities that are intended to promote social

36

FCC v RCA Communications 346 US 86, 92 (1953).
Maurice E Stucke & Allen P Grunes, ‘Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media
is a Bad Idea’ (2011) 105 Northwestern U L Rev 1399, 1401-02 (citing US statutory
antitrust exemptions for newspapers, agriculture, export activities, insurance, labor, fishing,
defense preparedness, professional sports, small business joint ventures, and local
governments).
38
City of Lafayette, La v Louisiana Power & Light Co 435 US 389, 413 (1978)
(“Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of
government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.”); State Corporation
Commission, Commonwealth of Virginia, Application of Beneficial Finance Corp., Case
No. 20095 (Aug. 24, 1979), 1979 S.C.C. Ann. Rept. 399 (Va.Corp.Com.), 1979 WL 4763
(Va.Corp.Com.), at 4 (noting how Virginia amended its small loan licensing statute with a
“convenience and advantage” clause to limit entry “so that the aims of the state's small loan
acts might not be subverted by the supposed harmful consequences of having too many
lenders and too much competition.”).
37
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Senator John Sherman, in response to proposed statutory

language that would exclude boycotts by temperance societies, did not
oppose the amendment. But he did not see
any reason for putting in temperance societies any more than
churches or school-houses or any other kind of moral or
educational associations that may be organized. Such an
association is not in any sense a combination arrangement made to
interfere with interstate commerce. 40
Thus, the Sherman Act’s “trade or commerce” element applies to
transactions one can characterize as “business” or “commercial.” 41

If

universities agree on the eligibility criteria for its student athletes, their
eligibility rules ordinarily are not subject to antitrust scrutiny. Rather than
intending to provide the universities with a commercial advantage, these
rules governing recruiting, improper inducements, and academic fraud
primarily seek “to ensure fair competition in intercollegiate athletics.” 42
D. Unfair Methods of Competition
Courts routinely reject the defense that every method of competing,
such as passing one’s goods off the brand of another, benefits society. 43
39

Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc v Hamilton College 128 F 3d 59, 63 (2nd
Cir. 1997).
40
21 Cong. Rec. 2658-59 (1890).
41
See, eg, Bassett v NCAA No. 06-5795, 2008 US App. LEXIS 12248, 2008 WL
2329755 (6th Cir. 9 June 2008); United States v Brown Univ 5 F 3d 658, 665 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding it “axiomatic that section one of the Sherman Act regulates only
transactions that are commercial in nature”).
42
Bassett v NCAA 528 F 3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Smith v NCAA 139 F
3d 180, 185 (3rd Cir. 1998)).
43
Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v Pharmadyne Laboratories 532 F Supp 1040,
1066-67 (D.N.J. 1980) (footnotes omitted):
In trying to drape themselves in the mantle of free competition, defendants are
disingenuous. Their decision to simulate plaintiffs' trade dress yields society no
benefits. Plaintiffs have worked hard to promote Persantine. As the record shows, they
have succeeded both in making their product widely known and in gaining a favorable
reputation among physicians and pharmacists. To overcome these advantages enjoyed
by Boehringer, defendants can stress the reasons why their generic product ought to be
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Although competition is beneficial, not all forms of competition are
beneficial. Just as athletic contests distinguish between fair and foul play,
the law distinguishes between fair and unfair methods of competition.44
This legislative policy recognizes that some methods of competition are
socially undesirable. As one treatise observed:
on ethical, religious and social sources, American law has
developed a minimum level or standard of “fairness” in
competitive rivalry. The law of unfair competition has developed
as a kind of Marquis of Queensbury code for competitive
infighting. To pursue the analogy, it would be equally as
unacceptable for the contestants in a prize-fight to agree privately
to “throw the fight” as it would be for one contestant to insert a
horseshoe in his glove. 45
***
In reviewing this Part, the antitrust community would not quibble about
eliminating or limiting competition in noncommercial activities. They
would debate over what constitutes fair and unfair methods of competition,
but agree that not all methods of competition are desirable. The antitrust
community would likely tolerate price and service regulations in some

prescribed instead, e.g., a quality product at a lower price. Above-board competition
directed at factors such as quality and price is in society's interests. Obtaining sales by
facilitating passing off is not. The effect of defendants' copying of Persantine is that
sales earned by plaintiffs through hard work are lost to pharmacist greed. The Lanham
Act and New Jersey common law embody society's belief that that form of
“competition” is socially undesirable, and may be restrained.
44
See, eg, Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, as amended, 15 USCA § 45; TianRui
Group Co Ltd v Int'l Trade Comm'n 661 F 3d 1322, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (concluding
that the International Trade Commission has authority under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19
USC § 1337 to investigate and grant relief based in part on extraterritorial conduct insofar
as it is necessary to protect domestic industries from injuries arising out of unfair
competition in the domestic marketplace); Dee Pridgen & Richard M Alderman, Consumer
Protection and the Law (West 2011) vol 1; Hazel Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts
(OUP 2001); Tony Weir, Economic Torts (OUP 1997) 3 (“the requirement that the means
(as opposed to the end) be wrongful (as opposed to generally deplorable) is entirely correct,
sensible and practical”).
45
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 2012) vol 1, § 1:23.
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industries (eg, natural monopolies) where competition is not feasible. 46 As
for antitrust immunities, the consensus within the antitrust community is
that they reflect the victory of special interest groups and the collective
action problem of citizens. 47 Antitrust immunity is rarely a good thing, is
rarely justifiable on the grounds of improving societal wellbeing, often
outlives its intended purpose, and should be read “narrowly, with beady
eyes and green eyeshades.” 48
For most other commercial activity, however, competition on the merits
is the presumed policy. As one American court observed:
The Sherman Act, embodying as it does a preference for
competition, has been since its enactment almost an economic
constitution for our complex national economy. A fair approach in
the accommodation between the seemingly disparate goals of
regulation and competition should be to assume that competition,
and thus antitrust law, does operate unless clearly displaced. 49
Few, if any, antitrust practitioners would disagree.

46

See, eg, Lancaster Cmty Hosp v Antelope Valley Hosp Dist 940 F 2d 397, 402 n 9
(9th Cir. 1991) (“This court, in considering whether a state has intended to displace
competition with regulation, seems to have considered whether competition is generally
thought to be a viable alternative to regulation in the relevant sphere of economic activity.
In cases involving paradigmatic natural monopolies, we have more readily found that the
legislature has intended to displace competition with regulation.”); Almeda Mall, Inc v
Houston Lighting & Power Co 615 F 2d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 1980) (“These industries are
regulated precisely because it has been determined that competition either cannot or should
not prevail there. Thus, the regulatory scheme not only seeks to act as a surrogate for
competition, but may, for public interest reasons, affirmatively seek to exclude competition
from the marketplace.”) (quoting Watson and Brunner, ‘Monopolization by Regulated
“Monopolies”: The Search for Substantive Standards’ (1977) 22 Antitrust Bull 559, 56669).
47
James C Cooper & William E Kovacic, ‘U.S. Convergence with International
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition’ (2010) 90 BU L
Rev 1555, 1582.
48
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v Nat’l Basketball Ass’n 961 F 2d 667, 671−72 (7th
Cir. 1992); Stucke & Grunes, supra note, at 1401-04.
49
Essential Communications Sys, Inc v Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. 610 F 2d 1114, 1117 (3d
Cir. 1979).
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III. THE DARK SIDE OF COMPETITION
In

condemning

private

and

public

anti-competitive

restraints,

competition officials and courts invariably prescribe competition as the
cure. Increasing competition “improves a country’s performance, opens
business opportunities to its citizens and reduces the cost of goods and
services throughout the economy.” 50 Competition, officials recognize, does
not cure every market failure (such as from negative externalities or public
goods). 51 Fierce competition ultimately may yield oligopolies or
monopolies. But that is a function of market conditions, not competition
itself. Competition itself cannot cause market failures.
Although competition is often beneficial, is competition always
beneficial? Economist Irving Fisher over a century ago examined two
assumptions of any laissez-faire doctrine:
first, each individual is the best judge of what subserves his own
interest, and the motive of self-interest leads him to secure the
maximum of well-being for himself; and, secondly, since society is
merely the sum of individuals, the effort of each to secure the
maximum of well-being for himself has as its necessary effect to
secure thereby also the maximum of well-being for society as a
whole. 52
In relaxing these two assumptions, Fisher discussed how competition is not
always beneficial. In the past decade, the economic literature has identified
several scenarios where the problem is not too little competition, or
concerns over unfair methods of competition, but the suboptimal effects
50

OECD, ‘Competition Assessment Toolkit version 2.0, Principles’ (2011) 3.
Shapiro, supra note (“In terms of the classic categories of market failure from the
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, most regulations  including environmental
regulations, health and safety regulations, and consumer protection regulations  primarily
address problems of externalities, public goods, and imperfect information. Competition
policy primarily addresses the problem of market power.”).
52
Irving Fisher, ‘Why Has the Doctrine of Laissez Faire Been Abandoned?’ Science (4
Jan. 1907) 19.
51
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from competition itself.
One could argue that the problem is not competition per se, but poor
regulatory controls. This is a valid point. Part of competition’s appeal is
that no consensus exists on its meaning. 53 Competition does not exist
abstractly, but is influenced by the existing legal and informal institutions.54
A chicken-egg dilemma follows: Is the problem with competition itself or
the legal and informal institutions that yielded this type of competition? The
different viewpoints depend in part on one’s ideological reference point—
namely the belief of competition existing outside a regulatory framework,
necessitating governmental intervention in the marketplace versus the belief
that regulatory forces help create and define the competitive market,
necessitating improvements to the legal framework. This Article identifies
the problem as competition itself, since under most theories of competition,
markets characterized with low entry barriers (and recent entry) should not
be prone to this type of market failure. 55 Whatever the theory (failure of

53

Maurice E Stucke, ‘What is Competition?’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals Of
Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012); Maurice E Stucke, ‘Reconsidering
Competition’ (2011) 81 Mississippi LJ 107.
54
Douglass C North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton
2005) 52; RH Coase, ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’ (1992) 82 Am Econ Rev
713, 717–18; FA Hayek in Bruce Caldwell (ed), The Road to Serfdom: Text and
Documents–The Definitive Edition (University of Chicago Press 2007) 87: Competition
‘depends, above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system
designed both to preserve competition and to make sure it operates as beneficially as
possible’.
55
High entry barriers, as John Davies pointed out to me, are also consistent with
suboptimal competition. In most markets, we might assume that if a merger reduces choice
in a way that damages consumer welfare, that creates an opportunity for a choice-restoring
entrant. However, there are cases in which the degree of choice does not evolve in a
market, but is imposed. Suppose there are two types of grocery chains–high quality/high
price gourmet supermarkets and every-day-low-price/low service supermarkets. Suppose a
town has two supermarkets: A (gourmet) and B (discounter). Suppose C (a chain of
discount supermarkets) buys Chain A, and finds it more profitable to change A’s product
offering to C’s private label in all the Chain A supermarkets. Now the town has two deepdiscount supermarkets: Chains B and C. In some countries, like the UK, the available
space (under the land planning system) for supermarkets is limited. Entry will not correct
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competition or regulations), society is worse off as a result. Beyond this
Article’s scope of whether competition is always good is the ubiquitous and
eternal issue of how to frame good regulation of markets to prevent
suboptimal competition and maximize the benefits of optimal competition.
Using the recent advances in behavioral economics, Subparts A and B
examine Fisher’s first assumption.

Surveying some recent empirical

economic work, Subparts C and D examine Fisher’s second assumption.
A. Behavioral Exploitation
Competition policy typically assumes that market participants can best
judge what subserves their interests. 56 Once we relax the assumption of
market participants’ rationality and willpower, then competition at times
leaves consumers and society worse off. Suboptimal competition can arise
when firms compete in fostering and exploiting demand-driven biases or
imperfect willpower.
To illustrate, suppose many consumers have biases and limited
willpower.

Competition benefits society when firms compete to help

consumers find solutions for their bounded rationality and willpower.
Alternatively, competition harms society when firms compete to better
the local worsening of the choice available to consumers, and reduction in aggregate
consumer welfare. A competition agency, however, would unlikely challenge the
supermarket merger, as competition will likely increase, not decrease, post-merger. Indeed,
instead of the weak competition between the highly differentiated high-end Supermarket A
and low-end offerings of Supermarket B, the town now enjoys head-to-head competition in
the same discount segment. But there is a loss of choice. Some consumers preferred A’s
high-end offering. Many–probably most–will have shopped at both stores, for different
items. All of those people have lost some welfare. As Davies observed, this scenario may
be unique to industries like retail chain mergers, when the new owners change the products
on sale immediately to match its house brands, which may not hold true of other types of
goods and services. But he raises an interesting example where competition increases but
consumer welfare decreases. Another example is competition among producers of harmful
goods. See eg Daniel A Crane, ‘Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from
the Tobacco Industry’ (2005) 39 Ga L Rev 321, 409.
56
Amanda P Reeves & Maurice E Stucke, ‘Behavioral Antitrust’ (2011) 86 Indiana LJ
1527 (2011).
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exploit consumers’ bounded rationality or willpower. Suboptimal
competition is unlikely if firms inform bounded rational consumers of other
firms’ attempts to exploit them. Providing this information is another facet
of competition—trust us, we will not exploit you. 57
But rather than compete to build consumers’ trust in their business,
firms instead compete in devising new ways to exploit consumers. 58 Firms
compete in devising better ways to manipulate consumption decisions by:
•

using framing effects and changing the reference point, such that the
price change is viewed as a discount, rather than a surcharge; 59

•

anchoring consumers to an artificially high suggested retail price, from
which bounded rational consumers negotiate; 60
57

See SCFC ILC, Inc v Visa USA, Inc 36 F 3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) (“If the
structure of the market is such that there is little potential for consumers to be harmed, we
need not be especially concerned with how firms behave because the presence of effective
competition will provide a powerful antidote to any effort to exploit consumers.” (quoting
George A Hay, ‘Market Power in Antitrust’ (1992) 60 Antitrust LJ 807, 808)).
58
See, eg, Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Servs, Inc 504 US 451, 474 n21
(1992) (noting that “in an equipment market with relatively few sellers, competitors may
find it more profitable to adopt Kodak’s service and parts policy than to inform the
consumers”); FTC v RF Keppel & Bro, Inc 291 US 304, 308, 313 (1934) (finding that
while competitors “reluctantly yielded” to the challenged practice to avoid loss of trade to
their competitors, a “trader may not, by pursuing a dishonest practice, force his competitors
to choose between its adoption or the loss of their trade”); Ford Motor Co. v FTC 120 F 2d
175, 179 (6th Cir. 1941) (Ford following industry leader General Motors in advertising a
deceptive six-percent financing plan); Matthew Bennett et al, ‘What Does Behavioral
Economics Mean for Competition Policy?’ (2010) 6 Competition Pol’y Int’l 111, 118;
Eliana Garcés-Tolon, ‘The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition
Policies’ (2010) 6 Competition Pol’y Int’l 145, 150.
59
Steffen Huck et al, ‘Consumer Behavioural Biases in Competition: A Survey,
Final Report for the OFT’ (May 2011) ¶ 2.5
[hereinafter OFT Report],
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/research/OFT1324.pdf.
60
In one experiment, MBA students put down the last two digits of their social
security number (eg, 14). Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That
Shape Our Decisions (HarperCollins 2008) 25-28. The students, then participants,
monetized it (eg, $14), and then answered for each bidded item “Yes or No” if they would
pay that amount for the item. The students then stated the maximum amount they were
willing to pay for each auctioned product. Students with the highest ending SSN (80-99)
bid 216 to 346 percent higher than students with low-end SSNs (1-20), who bid the lowest;
see also Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) 119-
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•

adding decoy options (such as restaurant’s adding higher priced wine)
to steer consumers to higher margin goods and services; 61

•

using the sunk cost fallacy to remind consumers of the financial
commitment they already made to induce them to continue paying
instalments on items, whose value is less than the remainder of
payments;

•

using the availability heuristic 62 to drive purchases, such as an airline
travel insurer using an emotionally salient death (from “terrorist acts”)
rather than a death from “all possible causes”; 63

•

using the focusing illusion in advertisements (ie, consumers predicting
greater personal happiness from consumption of the advertised good and
not accounting one’s adaptation to the new product); 64 and

•

giving the impression that their goods and services are of better quality
because they are higher priced 65 or based on one advertised
dimension. 66

28 (discussing anchoring effects generally).
61

Similarly, people “rarely choose things in absolute terms,” but instead based on
their relative advantage to other things. Ariely, supra note 60, at 2-6. By adding a third
more expensive choice, for example, the marketer can steer consumers to a more expensive
second choice. MIT students, in one experiment, were offered three choices for the
Economist magazine: (i) Internet-only subscription for $59 (sixteen students); (ii) printonly subscriptions for $125 (no students); and (iii) print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125
(eighty-four students). When the “decoy” second choice (print-only subscriptions) was
removed and only the first and third options were presented, the students did not react
similarly. Instead sixty-eight students opted for Internet-only subscriptions for $59 (up
from sixteen students) and only thirty-two students chose print-and-Internet subscriptions
for $125 (down from eighty-four students).
62

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases’ Science (27 Sept. 1974) 1127 (noting situations where people assess the “frequency
of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can
be brought to mind”).
63

See generally Eric J Johnson et al, ‘Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions’ (1993) 7 J Risk & Uncertainty 35.
64

Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 60, at 402-07.

65

Ariely, for example, conducted several experiments that revealed the power of
higher prices. Ariely, supra note, at 181-86. In one experiment, nearly all the participants
reported less pain after taking a placebo priced at $2.50 per dose; when the placebo was
discounted to $0.10 per dose, only half of the participants experienced less pain. Similarly,
MIT students who paid regular price for the “SoBe Adrenaline Rush” beverage reported
less fatigue than the students who paid one-third of regular price for the same drink. SoBe
Adrenaline Rush beverage was next promoted as energy for the students’ mind, and
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The credit card industry provides one example. Some consumers do not
understand the complex, opaque ways late fees and interest rates are
calculated, and are overoptimistic on their ability and willpower to pay the
credit card purchases timely. 67 They underestimate the costs of their future
borrowings and overestimate their likelihood of switching to lower interest
credit. 68 The consumers choose credit cards with lower annual fees (but
higher financing fees and penalties) over better-suited products (eg, credit
cards with higher annual fees but lower interest rates and late payment
penalties). 69
Rational companies can exploit consumers’ biases. 70 One former CEO,
for example, explained how his credit card company targeted low-income
customers “by offering ‘free’ credit cards that carried heavy hidden fees.” 71
The former CEO explained how these ads targeted consumers’ optimism:
“When people make the buying decision, they don’t look at the penalty fees

students after drinking the placebo, had to solve as many word puzzles as possible within
thirty minutes. Students who paid regular price for the drink got on average nine correct
responses, versus students who paid a discounted price for the same drink got on average
6.5 questions right.
66

OFT Report, supra note, at ¶ 3.130.

67

Stefano DellaVigna, ‘Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field’ (2009)
47 J of Econ Lit 315, 342; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’
(2008) 157 U Pa L Rev 1, 49, 47-52; Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F Delaney, ‘Credit Card
Accountability’ (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 157, 162–63; for a summary of the recent impact
regulatory impact on late fees, see Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CARD Act
Factsheet
(Feb.
2011),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-cardact/feb2011-factsheet/.
68
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note, at 51; DellaVigna, supra note, at 321.
69
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note, at 46.
70
OFT Report, supra note, at ¶¶ 3.31, 3.37, 3.43.
71
FRONTLINE: The Card Game, (Nov. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/view/ (interview with former
Providian CEO Shailesh Mehta).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2157193

15-OCT-12]

IS COMPETITION ALWAYS GOOD?

21

because they never believe they’ll be late. They never believe they’ll be
over limit, right?” 72
For other credit card competitors, exploiting consumer biases makes
more sense than incurring the costs to debias. 73 If a credit card issuer
invests in educating consumers of the likely total costs of using the credit
card, their bounded willpower, and overconfidence, other competitors can
free ride on the company’s educational efforts and quickly offer similar
credit cards with lower fees. Alternatively, the debiased consumers do not
remain with the helpful credit-card company. Instead they switch to the
remaining exploiting credit card firms, where they, along with the other
sophisticated customers, benefit from the exploitation (such as getting
airline miles for their purchases, while not incurring any late fees). 74 Under
either scenario, debiasing reduces the credit card company’s profits, without
offering any lasting competitive advantage. Consequently, the industry
profits more in exploiting consumers’ bounded rationality.

Naïve

consumers will not demand better-suited products. Firms have little
financial incentive to help naïve consumers choose better products. 75
Market supply skews toward products and services that exploit or reinforce
consumers’ bounded willpower and rationality.

72

Ibid.
For elegant economic models, see Paul Heidhues, Botond Köszegi, & Takeshi
Murooka, ‘Deception and Consumer Protection in Competitive Markets’ in Pros and Cons
of Consumer Protection (Konkurrensverket Swedish Competition Authority 2011) 44;
Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, ‘Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets’ (2006) 121 QJ Econ 505, 517-20.
74
Gabaix & Laibson, supra note, at 517-20.
75
See, eg, US Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(19 Aug. 2010) § 7.2, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html (noting
how the market is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if a firm that first offers a lower
price or improved product to customers will retain relatively few customers after its rivals
respond).
73
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Notice that the problem is not too few competitors. Indeed entry can
worsen the problem. 76 Nor is behavioural exploitation the typical cartel
problem, whereby firms collude explicitly (agreeing how they will compete
or refrain from competing) or tacitly (which still involves detecting and
punishing any deviations that “undermine the coordinated interaction”). 77
Instead behavioural exploitation is more like parallel accommodating
conduct, where “each rival’s response to competitive moves made by others
is individually rational, and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor
intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless
emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce
prices or offer customers better terms.” 78 Firms compete in devising
cleverer ways to attract and exploit bounded rational consumers with
imperfect willpower.
This suboptimal competition depends first on firms’ ability to identify
and exploit consumers whose biases, heuristics, and willpower make them
particularly vulnerable. Second, after identifying these consumers, firms
must be able to exploit them. 79 Third, the payoff from exploiting must
76

Heidhues et al, supra note, at 68 (modeling how “in socially wasteful industries—
independent of the number of competitors—firms will keep deceiving consumers even
when educating them would be costless” and “have strong incentives to engage in (nonappropriable) exploitative contract innovations—that is in finding new ways of charging
consumers unexpected fees—while they have no incentives to engage in (nonappropriable) contract innovations that benefit consumers”).
77
2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note, at § 7.
78
Ibid.
79
Financial markets, unlike prediction markets, lack a defined end-point. A rational
investor could “short” a company’s stock to profit when the stock price declines. But
rational traders do not know when the speculative bubble will burst. Rational traders, due
to investor pressure, can be subject to short-term horizons, and follow the herd for shortterm gains. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, ‘The Limits of Arbitrage’ (2007) 52 J Fin
35. Alternatively, consumers, recognizing their bounded rationality, can turn for some
decisions to more rational advisors or consumer advocates (such as Which? and Consumers
Union). Moreover the window for exploitation can be short-lived. Consumers can make
better decisions when they gain experience, quickly receive feedback on their earlier errors,
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exceed the likely payoff from debiasing consumers. 80

23
Firms lack an

incentive to debias if sophisticated consumers, for example, support the
exploiting firms as the myopic consumers subsidize their perks. 81 Finally,
naïve consumers cannot otherwise quickly debias. Thus, with enough naïve
consumers to profitably exploit in these markets, firms will compete in
devising better ways to exploit them.
Consequently, both antitrust and consumer protection law can
complement each other in promoting the opportunity for informed
consumer choices among the innovating firms’ helpful solutions for the
consumers’ problems. But consumer protection law also seeks to foreclose
suboptimal competition and prevent companies exploiting consumers’
biases and imperfect willpower to the consumers’ and society’s detriment.
B. Competitive Irrationality
Firms, like consumers, are susceptible to biases and heuristics. In
competitive settings—such as auctions and bidding wars—overconfidence
and passion may trump reason, leading participants to overpay for the
purchased assets. 82 But unlike demand-driven biases (eg, overconfident
discover their biases and heuristics in their earlier decisions, and take steps to debias. John
A List, ‘Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?’ (2003) 118 QJ Econ 41,
41. Rational traders may make more money by creating products that encourage, rather
than deter, speculation. Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral
Finance (OUP 2000) 172 (citing several examples, including future contracts on tulips
during the Tulipmania of the 1630s).
80
Gabaix & Laibson, supra note, at 509, 511.
81
OFT Report, supra note, at ¶¶ 3.47-3.52, 4.19 (noting that whenever sophisticated
consumers benefit from the exploitation of naïve consumers, firms will have no incentive
to debias); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note, at 507-09, 517-20 (discussing and modeling the
“curse of debiasing”).
82
DellaVigna, supra note, at 342. In one experiment, neuroscientists and economists
combined brain imaging techniques and behavioral economics research to better
understand why individuals overbid. Mauricio R Delgado et al, ‘Understanding
Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions’ (2008)
321 Science 1849, 1849. Specifically, they examined whether the fear of losing the social
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consumers demanding inappropriate financial products), competition should
check supply-driven biases.

Consumers, in competitive markets,

presumably punish firms’ costly biases by taking their business elsewhere.
If repeated biased decision-making is not punished, the problem is too little,
rather than too much, competition.
One exception is “competitive irrationality,” ie, when “two parties
engage in an activity that is clearly irrational in terms of the expected
outcomes to both sides, despite the fact that it is difficult to identify specific
irrational actions by either party.” 83 To demonstrate the competitive
escalation paradigm, Professors Max Bazerman and Don Moore auction a
$20 bill. 84 The auction proceeds in dollar increments. The highest bidder
wins the $20 bill; but the second highest bidder, as the loser, must pay the
auctioneer his or her bid. (So if the highest bid is $4, the winner receives
$16; if the second highest bid is $3, the loser must pay $3 to the auctioneer.)
Bidding over $20 for a $20 bill is irrational. Given the cost of losing, it
is also irrational to enter a bidding war. But if everyone believes this, no
one bids--also irrational. If only one person bids, that person gets a bargain.
competition inherent in an auction game causes people to overpay. Members in the “lossframe” group were given fifteen dollars at the beginning of each auction round. If they won
the auction for that round, they would get to keep the fifteen dollars and the payoff from
the auction. If they lost, they would have to return the fifteen dollars. Members in the
“bonus-frame” group, on the other hand, were told that if they won that auction round they
would get a fifteen-dollar bonus at the end of the round. Whether one gets fifteen dollars at
the beginning or end of the auction round should not affect a rational player: the winner of
each round gets fifteen extra dollars, the loser gets nothing. Nonetheless, the loss-frame
group members outbid the bonus-frame group members, although both outbid the baseline
group.
83
Max H Bazerman & Don A Moore, Judgment in Management Decision Making (7th
edn, Wiley 2009) 111. The business literature also discusses the competitive irrationality
of firms sacrificing profits and consumer welfare to obtain a relative advantage over a rival.
See Lorenz Graf et al, ‘Debiasing Competitive Irrationality: How Managers Can Be
Prevented from Trading Off Absolute for Relative Profit’ (2012) 30 European Management
J 386; Dennis B Arnett & Shelby D Hunt, ‘Competitive Irrationality: The Influence of
Moral Philosophy’ (2002) 12 Business Ethics Quarterly 279.
84
Bazerman & Moore, supra note, at 105.
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Once multiple bidders emerge, the second highest bidder fears having to
pay and escalates the commitment. As a result, the bidding in experiments
with undergraduate students, graduate students, and executives “typically
ends between $20 and $70, but hits $100 with some regularity.” 85
Bazerman and Moore analogize their experiment to merger contests.
Competitors A and B, for example, fear being competitively disadvantaged
if the other acquires cheaply Company C, a key supplier or buyer. 86 Firms
A and B may rationally decide to enter the bidding contest. Both are better
off if the other cannot acquire C, nonetheless neither can afford the other to
acquire the firm. Here clear antitrust standards can benefit the competitors.
If they both know they cannot acquire Company C under the antitrust laws,
neither will bid. Antitrust, while not always preventing the competitive
escalation paradigm, can prevent overbidding in highly concentrated
industries where market forces cannot punish competitive irrationality.
C. When Individual and Group Interests Diverge
Suppose the first assumption Fisher identifies is satisfied—people aptly
judge what serves their interest, which leads them to maximize their wellbeing.

Nonetheless, competition can be suboptimal if the second key

assumption is relaxed—namely the effort of each person to secure wellbeing has as its necessary effect to maximize society’s overall well-being.
Competition benefits society when individual and group interests and
incentives are aligned (or at least do not conflict). Difficulties arise when
individual interests and group interests conflict. 87 Indeed economist Robert
Frank recently predicted in a 100 years, most economists will identify as

85

Ibid 106.
Ibid 105.
87
Fisher, supra note, at 22 (“even when the act of an individual is actually for his own
benefit, it may not be for the benefit of society”).
86
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their discipline’s intellectual father, Charles Darwin: 88
As Darwin saw clearly, the fact that unfettered competition in
nature often fails to promote the common good has nothing to do
with monopoly exploitation. Rather, it’s a simple consequence of
an often sharp divergence between individual and group
interests. 89
One area of suboptimal competition is where advantages and
disadvantages are relative. 90 Frank used the bull elk as an example. It is in
each elk’s interest to have relatively larger antlers to defeat other bull elks.
But the larger antlers compromise the elks’ mobility, handicapping the
group overall. 91 Hockey players are another example. Hockey players
prefer wearing helmets. But to secure a relative competitive advantage, one
player chooses to play without a helmet. The other players follow. None
now have a competitive advantage from playing helmetless. Collectively
the hockey players are worse off. 92 Fisher’s example involves patrons
competing to exit a theater on fire; it is in each individual’s interest to get
ahead of others, but “the very intensity of such efforts in the aggregate
defeat their own ends.” 93 A recent example is Wall Street traders who
inject testosterone to obtain a competitive advantage. 94 One study found
that traders’ daily testosterone “was significantly higher on days when
traders made more than their 1-month daily average than on other days;” the

88

Robert H Frank, The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common
Good (Princeton U Press 2011) 16.
89
Frank, supra note, at 138.
90
Fisher, supra note, at 24 (“A general increase in relative advantage is a contradiction
in terms, so that in the end the racers as a whole have only their labor for their pains.”).
91
Frank, supra note, at 21.
92
Frank, supra note, at 8-9 (citing Thomas C Schelling, Micromotives and
Macrobehavior (1978)).
93
Fisher, supra note, at 22.
94
Charles Wallace, ‘Keep Taking the Testosterone’ Fin. Times (10 Feb. 2012) 10;
Cindy Perman, ‘Wall Streeters Buying Testosterone for an Edge’ CNBC (12 Jul 2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/beefy-wall-streeters-traders-rub-185904441.html.
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“results suggest that high morning testosterone predicts greater profitability
for the rest of that day.” 95 Higher testosterone levels, studies found,
increased “search persistence, appetite for risk, and fearlessness in the face
of novelty, qualities that would augment the performance of any trader who
had a positive expected return.” 96 Male and female traders, weighing the
benefits and risks, can rationally decide to increase their testosterone levels
to gain a competitive advantage over other traders (or at least not be
competitively disadvantaged against higher testosterone traders). However,
as other traders undertake hormone treatments, the traders no longer enjoy a
competitive advantage. They and society are collectively worse off. 97
This suboptimal competition is not a new concept. Many, however,
used a pejorative term, instead of competition, to describe it, such as
•

a collective action problem, 98

•

a race to the bottom or regulatory arbitrage--where states compete
away environmental, safety, and labor protections to obtain a
relative advantage, 99 or

95

JM Coates & J Herbert, ‘Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a
London Trading Floor’ (22 April 2008) 105 PNAS 6167, 6178.
96
Ibid 6170.
97
Ibid (noting studies that “if testosterone continued to rise or became chronically
elevated, it could begin to have the opposite effect on P&L and survival, because
testosterone has also been found to lead to impulsivity and sensation seeking, to harmful
risk taking, and, among users of anabolic steroids, to euphoria and mania”).
98
Frank, supra note, at 9.
99
H Geoffrey Moulton, Jr, ‘Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal
Ethics’ (1997) 82 Minn L Rev 73, 136-41 (“Most often employed in the contexts of
environmental and corporate regulation, the ‘race to the bottom’ argument for national
intervention posits that state competition for jobs, industry, and investment will lead states
to adopt lower-than-optimal regulatory standards. . . . In other words, a state government
acting strategically may rationally conclude that lax regulatory standards will increase its
constituents' welfare (by increasing investment and employment) by an amount greater
than any (in-state) costs resulting from the lower standards. Other states, however, will
naturally relax their own standards in response, in order to get ahead themselves or not be
left behind, ‘triggering a downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results.’”); Hodel v
Virginia Surface Mining 452 US 264, 268, 281-82 (1981) (noting that the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act responds to congressional concern that “nationwide ‘surface
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rational irrationality, whereby the “application of rational selfinterest in the marketplace leads to an inferior and socially irrational
outcome.” 100

For some, these scenarios simply involve competitors’ imposing
negative externalities on one another.

Negative externalities typically

involve some cost excluded from the product’s price. 101 Competition can
be seen as a negative externality on rivals, but an important distinction
exists. In some scenarios, a firm independent of any competitive pressure
imposes a negative externality to maximize profits. A utility monopoly, for
example, elects to pollute cheaply and let the community bear the
environmental and health costs to maximize its profits. In contrast, as this
Article discusses, competition induces the firm to impose the negative
externality, which absent competitive pressure, the firm would not
otherwise impose. The utility monopoly, for example, may lobby to keep
abay pesky environmentalists, but it would not expend resources on
mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in
interstate commerce ... will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to
improve and maintain adequate standards,’” and holding that “[t]he prevention of this sort
of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the
Commerce Clause”); Louis K Liggett Co v Lee 288 US 517, 557-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting in part) (noting how the leading industrial state governments relaxed the legal
limits upon the size and powers of business corporations not because they believed that
these restrictions were undesirable, but to compete with the lesser states, which eager for
the revenue, removed these legal safeguards: “The race was one not of diligence but of
laxity.”).
100
John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities (Farrar, Straus
and Giroux 2009) 142.
101
‘Externalities’ in Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition
Law, compiled by RS Khemani & DM Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for
Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993 (“Externalities refers to situations
when the effect of production or consumption of goods and services imposes costs or
benefits on others which are not reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services
being provided.”); McCloud v Testa 97 F 3d 1536, 1561 n21 (6th Cir. 1996) (negative
externalities arise “when the private costs of some activity are less than the total costs to
society of that activity,” so that “society produces more of the activity than is optimal
because private parties engaging in that activity essentially shift some of their costs onto
society as a whole”).
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lobbying to secure a relative competitive advantage when its market power
is otherwise secure.
Below are five scenarios where competition compounds the problem.
1. Lobbying
Today corporations and trade groups spend billions of dollars lobbying
the federal and state governments. 102 Microsoft, for example, historically
did little lobbying. 103 That changed after the United States filed its antitrust
lawsuit. Microsoft now spends millions of dollars annually on lobbying. 104
Not surprisingly, given the recent antitrust scrutiny, Google spends even
more on lobbying--$9,680,000 alone in 2011. 105
The Supreme Court quickened the race to the bottom when it
substantially weakened the limitations on corporate political spending, and
102

http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/. Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers:
The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (Pantheon 2010) 90-92, 179,
192 (“As of October 2009, 1,537 lobbyists representing financial institutions, other
businesses, and industry groups had registered to work on financial regulation proposals
before Congress—outnumbering by twenty-five to one the lobbyists representing consumer
groups, unions, and other supporters of stronger regulation.”); Maurice E Stucke, ‘Crony
Capitalism and Antitrust’ CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Oct 2011(2), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942045.
103
Jeffrey H Birnbaum, ‘Learning From Microsoft’s Error, Google Builds a Lobbying
Engine’ Wash. Post (20 June 2007) D1 (“For a couple of embarrassing years in the mid1990s, Microsoft’s primary lobbying presence was ‘Jack and his Jeep’ — Jack Krumholz,
the software giant’s lone in-house lobbyist, who drove a Jeep Grand Cherokee to lobbying
visits.”). Lobbyists have sought to influence antitrust decisions for years. Maurice E
Stucke, ‘Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?’ (2009) 42 UC Davis L Rev
1375, 1446-56. If anything is new (starting with Microsoft), observed Bert Foer, it is
probably the fairly standard retention in large antitrust cases of public relation firms and
media strategists, who have an easier time in the absence of a dedicated and expert antitrust
media.
104
Center for Responsive Politics, Heavy Hitters, Microsoft Corp.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=A&type=P&id=D000000115 (last
visited Sept. 29, 2011) (“Between 2000 and 2010, Microsoft spent at least $6 million each
year on federal lobbying efforts.”). Microsoft spent $7,335,000 in 2011.
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000115.
105
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000022008&year=2011;
Michael Liedtke, ‘Google’s Lobbying Bill Tops Previous Record’ Associated Press (21
July
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/googles-lobbying-bill-q22011_n_906149.html.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2157193

30

IS COMPETITION ALWAYS GOOD?

[15-OCT-12

thereby vastly increased the importance of pleasing large donors to win
elections. 106 The Court saw itself as removing an important competitive
restraint in the marketplace of ideas. But Justice Stevens saw competition’s
dark side:
In this transactional spirit, some corporations have affirmatively
urged Congress to place limits on their electioneering
communications. These corporations fear that officeholders will
shake them down for supportive ads, that they will have to spend
increasing sums on elections in an ever-escalating arms race with
their competitors, and that public trust in business will be eroded.
A system that effectively forces corporations to use their
shareholders' money both to maintain access to, and to avoid
retribution from, elected officials may ultimately prove more
harmful than beneficial to many corporations. It can impose a kind
of implicit tax.107
This competitive pressure to lobby to secure a relative advantage (or
prevent a relative disadvantage) harms not only the firms. It undermines a
democracy. 108 Part of the current malaise, the Occupy Wall Street

106

Citizens United v Fed Election Comm'n 130 S Ct 876, 910, 175 L Ed 2d 753

(2010).
107

Citizens United, 130 S Ct at 973 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part) (internal citation omitted); see also Daniel A Farber & Philip P Frickey, ‘The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice’ (1987) 65 Tex L Rev 873, 906-07:
No group can afford to drop out of the contest for government handouts;
members of a group that did would pay the same taxes but receiver fewer
benefits, thus redistributing income to the remaining contestants. As in the
‘prisoner's dilemma’ game, however, the result of this individually rational
behavior is that everyone is worse off. This creates a kind of ‘race to the
bottom,’ in which pork-barrel politics displaces pursuit of the public interest—a
situation individuals may deplore even as they find themselves compelled to
participate. Even if everybody belonged to a special interest group, so that
special interest politics did not affect the distribution of wealth, interest groups
still would direct resources to socially unproductive programs.
108
Albert R. Hunt, ‘Letter From Washington: Super PACs Fuel a Race to the Bottom’
N.Y.
Times
(4
March
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/us/05ihtletter05.html?pagewanted=all
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movement reflects, is the distrust in government given its capture to special
interests. 109
2. Bribery and Unethical Behavior
When auditor Ernst and Young recently surveyed nearly 400 chief
financial officers, its findings were disturbing:
•

When presented with a list of possibly questionable actions that
may help the business survive, 47% of CFOs felt one or more
could be justified in an economic downturn
• Worryingly, 15% of CFOs surveyed would be willing to make
cash payments to win or retain business and 4% view
misstating a company's financial performance as justifiable to
help a business survive
• While 46% of total respondents agree that company
management is likely to cut corners to meet targets, CFOs have
an even more pessimistic view (52%). 110
Competition, economist Andrei Shleifer discusses, can pressure
companies to engage in unethical or criminal behavior, if doing so yields
the firm a relative competitive advantage. 111

Other recent economic

literature discusses how competition can encourage companies to
•

invest less in legal compliance and more likely violate the law, 112

•

pay kickbacks to secure business, 113

109

Maurice E Stucke, ‘Occupy Wall Street and Antitrust’ 86 Southern California L
Rev Postscript (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002234.
110
Ernst & Young, 12th Global Fraud Survey Growing Beyond: a place for integrity,
CFOs in the spotlight <http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Assurance/Fraud-Investigation--Dispute-Services/Global-Fraud-Survey---a-place-for-integrity---CFOs-in-the-spotlight>.
111
Andrei Shleifer, ‘Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?’ (2004) 94 Am
Econ Rev 414, 414-16 (discussing how competition can help spread child labor, corruption
and bribery of government officials to reduce the amount the companies owe in tariffs and
taxes, excessive executive pay, manipulate earnings to lower corporation’s cost of capital,
and involvement of universities in commercial activities).
112
Fernando Branco & J Miguel Villas-Boas, ‘Competitive Vices’ (May 2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1921617 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1921617; Brian W
Kulik et al, ‘Do Competitive Environments Lead to the Rise and Spread of Unethical
Behavior? Parallels from Enron’ (2008) 83 J of Business Ethics 703.
113
W Harvey Hegarty & Henry P Sims, ‘Some Determinants of Unethical Decision
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•

underreport profits to avoid taxes, 114 and

•

manipulate the ordering protocols on liver transplants. 115

The studies’ underlying theme is that as competition increases, and
profit margins decrease, firms have greater incentive to engage in unethical
behavior that improves their costs (relative to competitors). Other firms,
given the cost disadvantage, face competitive pressure to follow; such
competition collectively leaves the firms and society worse off. 116
Not surprisingly the business literature, after the financial crisis, argues
for a “more sophisticated form of capitalism, one imbued with a social
purpose.” 117 In the past, the concepts of sustainability, fairness, and
profitability generally were seen as conflicting. But under a shared value
worldview, these concepts are reinforcing. 118 Profits can be attained, not
Behavior: An Experiment’ (1978) 63 J of Applied Psychology 451, 455-56.
114
Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, ‘Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence
From Chinese Industrial Firms’ (2009) 119 Economic J 764, 765-66 (empirically studying
Chinese firms).
115
Jason Snyder, ‘Gaming the Liver Transplant Market’ Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization Advance Access (published 1 April 2010). Using the policy changes in
ranking kidney transplant candidates, the study examined changes in hospitals’ behavior in
admitting kidney transplant candidates into the intensive care unit (which under the former
policy increased the candidates’ ranking). After the policy change, the use of the ICU
decreased more in markets with more transplant centers and the percentage of relatively
healthy people in the ICU decreased most in the areas with more firms. “It appears that
each competing center used the ICU to move their sickest patients to the top of the list and
had a negligible overall impact on the rank ordering of patients waiting for a liver.” ibid 3.
116
Kent Greenfield, ‘Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms)’ (2001) 87
Va L Rev 1279, 1349-51 (“Without such a term, the pressure on corporate managers to
make money for the firm would force managers to compete to their collective detriment
through illegality.”).
117
Michael E Porter & Mark R Kramer, ‘Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent
Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth’ Harv Bus Rev (Jan–Feb
2011) 62, 77; see also Dominic Barton, ‘Capitalism for the Long Term’ Harv Bus Rev,
(Mar 2011); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, ‘How Great Companies Think Differently’ Harv Bus
Rev (Nov 2011) 66; Symposium on Conscious Capitalism (2011) 53 California
Management Review 60 et seq.
118
Porter & Kramer, supra note, at 64, 66 (Shared value “involves creating economic
value . . . for society by addressing its needs and challenges” and “enhanc[ing] the
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social
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through a competitive race to the bottom, but in better helping address
societal needs. Sustainability, rather than a cost, represents an opportunity
for companies to improve productivity and societal welfare.
3. Financial Institutions
The conflict between collective and individual interests arose in the
financial crisis. Banks, the OECD described, are prone to take substantial
risks:
First, the opacity and the long maturity of banks' assets make it
easier to cover any misallocation of resources, at least in the short
run. Second, the wide dispersion of bank debt among small,
uninformed (and often fully insured) investors prevents any
effective discipline on banks from the side of depositors. Thus,
because banks can behave less prudently without being easily
detected or being forced to pay additional funding costs, they have
stronger incentives to take risk than firms in other industries.
Examples of fraud and excessive risk are numerous in the history
of financial systems as the current crisis has also shown. 119
An overleveraged financial institution can ignore the small probability
that its risky conduct in conjunction with its competitors’ risky conduct may
bring down the entire economy. 120

To gain additional profits and a

conditions in the communities in which it operates.”).
119
OECD, Bank Competition and Financial Stability (OECD Publishing 27 Oct 2011)
24.
120
One court found a compelling inference from the complaint that
the Officer Defendants were deliberately reckless in their public statements
regarding loan quality and underwriting. First, the confidential witness
statements describe a staggering race-to-the-bottom of loan quality and
underwriting standards as part of an effort to originate more loans for sale
through secondary market transactions. The witnesses catalogue an explosive
increase in risky loan products, including interest-only loans, stated income
loans, and adjustable-rate loans, and a serious decline in loan quality and
underwriting. . . . Several witnesses portray an underwriting system driven by
volume and riddled with exceptions. They state that the goal was to “push more
loans through,” that “there was always someone to sign off on any loan,” that
nearly any loan was approved to meet its sales projections, and that exceptions
were commonly made for the otherwise unqualified. There are specific instances
of loose standards, as when an employee recommended denial of a loan
application but higher-level managers repeatedly approved those loans, or when
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competitive advantage, each firm will incur greater leverage. Even for
rationalchoice theorists like Richard Posner, the government must be a
countervailing force to such self-interested rational private behavior by
better regulating financial institutions.121 Otherwise competition among
rational self-interested “law-abiding financiers and consumers can
precipitate an economic disaster.” 122
One may wonder that if competition is the problem, is monopoly the
cure. The remedy is neither monopoly nor overregulation (which besides
impeding competition, stifles innovation and renders the financial system
inefficient or unprofitable). But the remedy is not simply more competition,
which can increase the financial system’s instability, as banks increase
leverage and risk. 123 Instead the financial industry must be “competitive
enough to provide a range of services at a reasonable price for consumers,
but are not prone to periods of excess competition, where risk is under
priced (for example, to gain market share) and competitors fail as a result

underwriters allowed rejected loans, usually because borrowers' incomes were
too low, a second chance and approved the formerly rejected loans. There is
testimony that instructions, according to managers, came from the corporate
officers, and that officers had access to information on the effects of these
practices, including the rising defaults. There are also indications that the
compensation for sales reinforced the disregard for standards and quality as
volume was linked to reward.
In re New Century 588 F Supp 2d 1206, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citations to complaint
omitted).
121
Richard A Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent Into
Depression (Harvard U Press 2009) xii, 242-43; see also OECD, Bank Competition and
Financial Stability (2011) 28-29 (“Regulation should help to reduce the potential for any
detrimental effects of competition on financial stability, in particular, by making banks less
inclined to take on excessive risks.”).
122
Posner, supra note, at 107; see also ibid 111-12.
123
US v Philadelphia Nat Bank 374 US 321, 380 (1963) (noting how “[u]nrestricted
bank competition was thought to have been a major cause of the panic of 1907 and of the
bank failures of the 1930's, and was regarded as a highly undesirable condition to impose
on banks in the future”).
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with systemic consequences.” 124
4. Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Clauses
MFN clauses, the subject of two recent DOJ enforcement actions, are
topical. 125 Some courts have embraced MFNs as pro-competitive. MFN
clauses, Posner wrote, “are standard devices by which buyers try to bargain
for low prices, by getting the seller to agree to treat them as favorably as
any of their other customers.” 126 This “is the sort of conduct that the
antitrust laws seek to encourage.” 127 Likewise, another court found that the
MFN’s “insisting on a supplier's lowest price—assuming that the price is
not ‘predatory’ or below the supplier's incremental cost—tends to further
competition on the merits.” 128 It seemed “silly” to the court “to argue that a
policy to pay the same amount for the same service is anticompetitive, even
on the part of one who has market power. This, it would seem, is what
competition should be all about.” 129
Antitrust scholarship has identified MFN’s potential anticompetitive
effects. 130 The purpose here is to illustrate how individual and collective
124

OECD, Bank Competition, supra note, at 9.
Compl. ¶ 65, US v Apple, Inc., Civ. Action No. 1:12-cv-02826-UA (S.D.N.Y. filed
Apr. 11, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/applebooks.html (challenging,
inter alia, “unusual” MFN whereby the book publishers agreed to lower the retail price of
their e-books on Apple’s iBookstore to the lowest price by any other retailer); Compl.,
United States v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv-15155 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f263200/263235.pdf.
126
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v Marshfield Clinic 65 F 3d 1406,
1415 (7th Cir. 1995).
127
Marshfield Clinic 65 F 3d at 1415. The DOJ and FTC supported a rehearing en
banc in part because of the court’s permissive language on MFNs. Brief for the United
States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for
Rehearing, Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v Marshfield Clinic 65 F3d
1406
(7th
Cir.
filed
October
2,
1995),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f0400/0421.htm#N_2_.
128
Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode
Island 883 F 2d 1101, 1110 (1st Cir. 1989).
129
Ibid.
130
Jonathan B Baker, ‘Vertical Restraints With Horizontal Consequences: Competitive
Effects Of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses’ (1996) 64 Antitrust LJ 517; Arnold
125
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interests diverge in competitive environments, leaving buyers collectively
worse off. The FTC in Ethyl described this divergence:
An individual customer may rationally wish to have advance
notice of price increases, uniform delivered pricing, or most
favored nation clauses available in connection with the purchase of
antiknock compounds. However, individual purchasers are often
unable to perceive or to measure the overall effect of all sellers
pursuing the same practices with many buyers, and do not
understand or appreciate the benefit of prohibiting the practices to
improve the competitive environment. . . . a most favored nation
clause is perceived by individual buyers to guarantee low prices;
whereas widespread use of the clauses has the opposite effect of
keeping prices high and uniform. In short, marketing practices that
are preferred by both sellers and buyers may still have an
anticompetitive effect. 131
The appellate court, however, disagreed. 132 The MFN, observed the court,
“assured the smaller refiners that they would not be placed at a competitive
disadvantage on account of price discounts to giants such as Standard Oil,
Texaco and Gulf.” 133
What the appellate court failed to grasp is that MFNs--while
individually rational--can be collectively irrational. 134 MFNs assure buyers

Celnicker, ‘A Competitive Analysis of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts
Between Health Care Providers and Insurers’ (1991) 69 NC L Rev 863, 883-91.
131
Matter of Ethyl Corp, 101 FTC 425 (1983), vacated by EI du Pont de Nemours &
Co v FTC 729 F 2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Contracts that Reference Rivals,
Presented at Georgetown University Law Center Antitrust Seminar (5 Apr. 2012),
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.pdf (making similar point, stating “Indeed, the
idea that the buyer requests the MFN, and that the MFN will deliver a lower price to the
buyer, is a common intuition for why MFNs should be procompetitive.”).
132
du Pont 729 F 2d at 134.
133
Ibid.
134
Baker, supra note, at 533 (“when buyers desire something individually, one cannot
assume, as these courts have done, that it is in the buyers' interest collectively to obtain it”).
The appellate court may have ruled otherwise if the evidence showed that the sellers
“adopted or continued to use the most favored nation clause for the purpose of influencing
the price discounting policies of other producers or of facilitating their adoption of or
adherence to uniform prices.” du Pont 729 F 2d at 134. Whether MFNs are demand-driven
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that others during a specific time period will not pay a lower price. If the
buyers fiercely compete, MFNs seemingly provide a relative cost
advantage. The buyer need not expend time and expense to negotiate a
lower price; it can free ride on other buyers’ efforts. It is in each buyer’s
individual interest to secure this cost advantage; thus buyers may demand,
and sellers may offer, MFN protection. 135 Competition drives buyers to
demand MFN protection to lower their transaction costs; the number of
buyers willing to invest in procuring a discount shrink. (Why should they
uniquely incur the cost, when the benefits accrue to their rivals?) As one
antitrust scholar observed, “buyer competition to obtain most-favoredcustomer protection, in the end, can cost buyers as a group.” 136
5. Status Competition
Status competition epitomizes competition for relative position among
consumers with interdependent preferences. 137

The ancient Greek and

Roman philosophers, 138 early Christian theologians, 139 and economists

(customers seeking to maximize their self-interest) or supply-driven (sellers marketing
MFNs), once MFNs are widespread in the industry, the anticompetitive outcome is the
same--higher equilibrium prices. Perhaps the appellate court believed that sellers are more
blameworthy if they actively promote MFNs for an ulterior anticompetitive purpose rather
than responding to consumer demand.
135
Scott-Morton, supra note (“Indeed, the idea that the buyer requests the MFN, and
that the MFN will deliver a lower price to the buyer, is a common intuition for why MFNs
should be procompetitive.”).
136
Baker, supra note, at 533.
137
Angela Chao & Juliet B Schor, ‘Empirical Tests of Status Competition: Evidence
from Women’s Cosmetics’ (1998) 19 J of Economic Psychology 107, 108-09.
138
Seneca, ‘Letter CXXIII’ in Letters from a Stoic (Robin Campbell trans, 1969) 227
(observing how some gadgets are purchased not because of their inherent utility, but
“because others have bought them or they’re in most people’s houses”); Plutarch, ‘On
Contentment’ in Essays (Ian Kidd ed, Robin H. Waterfield trans, 1992) 222 (observing
how prisoners “envy those who have been freed, who envy those with citizen status, who in
turn envy rich people, who envy province commanders, who envy kings, who—because
they almost aspire to making thunder and lightning—envy the gods”).
139
Saint Augustine, Confessions (1961) 33 (acknowledging “man’s insatiable desire
for the poverty he calls wealth”); Saint Thomas Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae,
reprinted in Aquinas’s Shorter Summa 353–56 (2002).
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Adam Smith 140 and Thorstein Veblen 141 described how status competition
is never won. Either people adapt to their fancier lifestyle, and envy those
on the higher rung. 142 Or others catch up in their consumption (eg, similarly
large homes, extravagant parties), increasing the demand for conspicuous
consumption or leisure that provide a relative advantage.
Despite status competition’s durability and prevalence, few praise it.
C.S. Lewis, for example, observed that pride generally is the “essential
vice” and “complete anti-God state of mind.” 143 Pride is competition gone
bad: “Pride is essentially competitive—is competitive by its very nature—
while the other vices are competitive only, so to speak, by accident.”144
Status competition not only taxes individuals but society overall. 145 Pride,
Lewis wrote, “has been the chief cause of misery in every nation and every
family since the world began.” 146
As economists that study subjective well-being conclude, “[h]igher140

Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: A. Millar. 1790. Library
of
Economics
and
Liberty
[Online]
available
from
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS4.html; accessed 26 September 2012) IV.I.8, at
183 (trinkets’ real purpose is to “more effectually gratify that love of distinction so natural
to man”).
141
Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Penguin Books 1994) (1899)
26, 103–04 (observing that the predominant motive for conspicuous consumption is the
“invidious distinction attaching to wealth”). The accumulation of goods and services forms
the conventional basis of esteem. He too noted how the hedonic treadmill never stops:
“[T]he present pecuniary standard [marks] the point of departure for a fresh increase in
wealth; and this in turn gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency and a new pecuniary
classification of one’s self as compared with one’s neighbors.” ibid 31.
142
Alois Stutzer & Bruno S Frey, ‘Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual
Subjective Well-Being’ (Summer 2010) 77 Social Research 679, 690; Seneca, ‘Letter CIV’
in Letters from a Stoic, supra note, at 186 (“However much you possess there’s someone
else who has more, and you’ll be fancying yourself to be short of things you need to the
exact extent to which you lag behind him.”).
143
CS Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952) (HarperCollins 2000) 121-22.
144
Lewis, Mere Christianity, supra note, at 122.
145
Fisher, supra note, at 25; Frank, supra note, at 76-81 (discussing a progressive
consumption tax).
146
Lewis, supra note, at 123-24; see also Veblen, supra note, at 31 (chronically
dissatisfied with his present lot, man will strain to place “a wider and ever-widening
pecuniary interval between himself and the average standard”); Smith, supra note, at 184.
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income aspirations reduce people’s satisfaction with life.” 147 Wealthier
people impose a negative externality on poorer people. 148 Antitrust norms,
such as a per se prohibition of resale price maintenance for status goods, 149
are also difficult to reconcile with status competition where individual and
collective interests can diverge to consumers’ and society’s detriment. 150
Status competition has confounded consumers and economists for
centuries. John Maynard Keynes, for example, assumed that with greater
productivity and higher living standards, people in developed economies

147

Stutzer & Frey, Recent Advances, supra note, at 691; Richard Layard, ‘Happiness
& Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession’ (2006) 116 The Economic J C24–C33.
148
Stutzer & Frey, Recent Advances, supra note, at 690; Bruno S Frey, Happiness: A
Revolution in Economics (MIT Press 2008) 31.
149
As I discuss elsewhere, each purchaser’s individual interest is to purchase the status
good at a discount, while others pay the full retail price to preserve the product’s symbol of
conspicuous consumption. Maurice E Stucke, ‘Money, Is That What I Want? Competition
Policy & the Role of Behavioral Economics’ (2010) 50 Santa Clara L Rev 893. Likewise,
each retailer’s individual interest is to offer a discount while its competitors charge the full
price. Absent RPM, a race to the bottom, here the discount bin, ensues. As retailers
discount, more consumers can afford the status good. But the good’s status value
depreciates. Early adopters disapprove of the brand’s commoditization, and switch to other
status symbols. As more consumers disapprove of the brand as cheap and vulgar, the
manufacturer and retailers lower price to maintain demand levels (primarily among
consumers who previously could not afford the item). Arguably banning RPM could
reduce status competition. Far-sighted consumers can see the natural cycle of early
adoption, emulation, and rejection. Why purchase the $100 polo shirt that in several years
retails for $30? But this proves too much. Far-sighted consumers would recognize the tax
and misery imposed by status competition, and forego status competition whether RPM
was legal or illegal.
150
Group boycotts and agreements to restrict purchases are per se illegal. But suppose
consumers collectively agreed to disarm the birthday party arms-race by boycotting
expensive toys, gift bags, and birthday entertainers. William Doherty, Beyond the
Consulting
Room--Therapists
as
catalysts
of
social
change,
see
http://www.psychotherapynetworker.org/symposium-2011/326-522-after-the-affair-;
also http://www.cehd.umn.edu/fsos/projects/birthdays/parents.asp#gifts. One grass roots
movements is seeking to curb this social competition, including patents taking a Green
Birthday Pledge, which includes hosting “a 'no-gift' or ‘giving party’ or a ‘swap party’ to
cut back on unwanted toys and excess packaging and wrapping” and skipping “the goody
bag loaded with cheap plastic toys and candy.” http://www.enviromom.com/host-a-greenbirthday-par.html. Only an overzealous antitrust official would prosecute their group
boycott.
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would work only fifteen hours per week. 151 He identified two classes of
needs—“those needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them
whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be, and those which
are relative in the sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us
above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows.” 152 As its economy
developed, Keynes predicted, society would deemphasize the importance of
relative needs. 153
So why aren’t many Americans, Europeans, and Asians today working
fifteen or twenty hours per week? Keynes correctly predicted the rise in
productivity and real living standards. But he “underestimated the appeal of
materialism.” 154 Fisher, however, grasped this:
Much has been said of late about the importance of living the
simple life, but so far as I know there has been no analysis to show
why it is not lived. This analysis would reveal that the failure to
live it is due to a kind of unconscious cut-throat competition in
fashionable society. 155
Status competition is often, but not always, detrimental. On the bright
side, people voluntarily compete and use Internet peer pressure to change
their energy consumption, driving, and exercise habits. 156 But status
competition is often suboptimal. One interesting empirical study sought to
understand why academics cheated by inflating the number of times their
papers were downloaded on the Social Science Research Network

151

John Maynard Keynes, ‘Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren’ in Essays In
Persuasion (1932) 358, 369 (“For three hours a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam
in most of us!”).
152
Ibid 365.
153
Ibid 369–70.
154
Jonathan Guthrie, ‘Anything to Distract Us from the Arts of Life’ Fin. Times (30
Apr. 2009) 11 (quoting Professor Alan Manning).
155
Fisher, supra note, at 25.
156
Tim Bradshaw, ‘Peer Groups that Harness an Online Community Spirit’ Fin. Times
(6 Aug. 2009) 12.
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(SSRN). 157 SSRN ranks authors, their papers, and their academic
institutions by the number of times the papers are downloaded. 158 Some
authors repeatedly downloaded their own papers to inflate the publicly
recorded download count. Why the deception? Status competition, the
study found, was a key contributor. 159
D. When Competition Among Intermediaries Reduces Accuracy
Underlying democracies is the belief that competition fosters the
marketplace of ideas: truth prevails in the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources. 160 Competition should,
and often does, improve accuracy. 161

But competition can decrease

accuracy when intermediaries, who monitor or report market participants’
businesses, property, goods, services, or behavior, also compete for the
market participants’ business. Competition becomes a race to the bottom
when intermediaries, to gain market share, shade their findings to the
purchasers’ liking, but society’s detriment.
The concern is that competition increases the pressure on intermediaries
to engage in unethical behavior. Home appraisers, pressured by threats of
losing business to competitors, inflate their valuations to the benefit of real
157

Benjamin G Edelman & Ian Larkin, ‘Demographics, Career Concerns or Social
Comparison: Who Games SSRN Download Counts?’ Harvard Business School NOM Unit
Working Paper No. 09-096 (19 Feb. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346397
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1346397.
158
http://www.ssrn.com/.
159
Edelman & Larkin, supra note, at 4, 17 (finding “strong evidence that envy and
social comparisons play a strong role in predicting deceptive downloads. Higher levels of
reported downloads for three separate peer groups – an author’s institution, other [peers]
within an SSRN e-journal, and [peers] within an e-journal publishing papers on SSRN at
about the same time as the author in question – are associated with 12% to 30% more
invalid downloads.”).
160
Maurice E Stucke & Allen P Grunes, ‘Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas’
(2001) 69 Antitrust LJ 249.
161
Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M Shapiro, ‘Competition & Truth in the Market for
News’ (2008) 22 J of Economic Perspectives 133; Stefano DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan,
‘The Political Impact of Media Bias’ in Fact Finder, Fact Filter: How Media Reporting
Affects Public Policy (2007).
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estate brokers (who gain higher commissions) and lenders (who make
bigger loans and earn greater returns when selling them to investors). 162
Facing competitive pressure, lawyers can also adopt “a stronger adversarial
and client-centered approach in the hope that this stance will be rewarded
by clients' preferences;” more complaints about lawyer misconduct
ensue. 163
This subpart discusses two industries, where, as recent economic studies
found, greater competition yielded more unethical conduct among
intermediaries. Markets where intermediaries can manipulate information
and test results can enjoy greater efficiency with less competition.
1. Ratings Industry
Ratings agencies provide several complementary functions:
162

Vikas Bajaj, ‘New York Says Appraiser Inflated Value of Homes’ N.Y. Times (2
Nov. 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/business/02appraise.html; Les Christie,
‘Taming inflated home appraisals: New guidelines aim to reduce the pressure that real
estate appraisers feel to boost home values’ (CNNMoney 14 Jan. 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/14/real_estate/appraisal_reform/index.htm; (citing Kenneth
R. Harney, ‘Appraisers Say Pressure on Them to Fudge Values is Up Sharply’
(RealtyTimes 5 Feb. 2007), http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20070205_appraisers.htm (90%
of 1200 surveyed real estate appraisers said mortgage brokers, realty agents, lenders and
individual home sellers pressured them to raise property valuations, a huge increase over
just the 2003 survey results and 75% of appraisers reported "negative ramifications" when
they declined requests for inflated valuations); Julie Haviv, ‘Some US Appraisers Feel
Pressure To Inflate Home Values’ Wall Street Journal (9 Feb. 2004) (citing 2003 October
Research survey of 500 fee appraisers across the country, with at least five years of
experience in the residential real estate appraisal business, that 55% said they have felt
pressure to inflate the values of properties, with 25% of those respondents saying it
happens nearly half the time), http://www.octoberresearch.com/about-news-releasesdetails.cfm?ID=4.
163
Neta Ziv, ‘Regulation of Israeli Lawyers: From Professional Autonomy to MultiInstitutional Regulation’ (2009) 77 Fordham L Rev 1763, 1794 & n54 (discussing concerns
within Israel about greater lawyer misconduct from increased competition); see also Robin
Wellford Slocum, ‘The Dilemma of the Vengeful Client: A Prescriptive Framework for
Cooling the Flames of Anger’ (2009) 92 Marq L Rev 481, 486 (“Within the legal
profession itself, an excessive focus on the economic outcomes of legal matters, to the
exclusion of psychological and emotional costs, has contributed to an environment of
brutal competition and unethical behavior--an environment where everyone is a potential
adversary and trust is a mirage on the horizon.”) (internal quotation omitted).
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(i) to measure the credit risk of an obligor and help to resolve the
fundamental information asymmetry between issuers and
investors, (ii) to provide a means of comparison of embedded
credit risk across issuers, instruments, countries and over time; and
(iii) to provide market participants with a common standard or
language to use in referring to credit risk. 164
The DOJ, as one expects from an antitrust agency, advocated for more entry
and competition in the ratings industry, which two firms long dominated.
The DOJ asked in 1998 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to modify its proposed regulations “so that new rating agencies could
more easily enter the market, thereby increasing competition.” 165 The SEC's
proposal “would erect a nearly insurmountable barrier to entry by new and
well-qualified firms into the market for securities ratings services,” which
could have “chilling effects on competition and could raise prices for
securities ratings." 166 In 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, the DOJ
favorably recalled its earlier competition advocacy. 167 The DOJ assumed
that increasing competition in the ratings industry would benefit, not harm,
investors and society.
One cannot fault the DOJ for its assumption, as entry, in increasing
competition, often benefits consumers. But under an issuer-pays model,168
increasing competition among the ratings agencies, the OECD found, “is

164

OECD, Bank Competition, supra note, at 25.
US Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Press Release, DOJ Urges SEC to Increase
Competition
for
Securities
Ratings
Agencies
(6
March
1998),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/212587.htm.
166
Press Release, supra note.
167
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate For
Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee Competition and Financial
Markets, Note by the United States, DAF/COMP/WD(2009)11 (30 Jan. 2009) 10-11
(noting how it urged “the SEC to modify its proposed rules for securities ratings agencies
so that new rating agencies could more easily enter the market, thereby increasing
competition”).
168
Issuers, whose securities the agencies rate, pay the fees.
165
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not an unambiguously positive development, as it can create a bias in favour
of inflated ratings under certain circumstances.” 169 This became evident
after the financial crisis. As the OECD described,
The growth and development of the market in structured finance
and associated increase in securitisation activity occurred at a time
when Fitch Ratings was becoming a viable competitor to Standard
& Poor’s and Moody’s, in effect, breaking up the duopoly the two
[rating agencies] had previously enjoyed. The increased
competition resulted in significant ratings grade inflation as the
agencies competed for market share. Importantly, the ratings
inflation was attributable not to the valuation models used by the
agencies, but rather to systematic departures from those models, as
the agencies made discretionary upward adjustments in ratings in
efforts to retain or capture business, a direct consequence of the
issuer-pays business model and increased concentration among
investment banks. Issuers could credibly threaten to take their
business elsewhere. 170
With the expansion of Fitch Ratings, the competitive pressures on the
ratings agencies increased. 171 The ratings agencies’ cultures changed. They
placed greater emphasis on increasing market share and short-term profits.
The novel financial instruments they rated, credit default swaps (CDS) and
credit debt obligations (CDOs), were a growing and relatively more
profitable sector. A competitive race to the bottom ensued. Moody’s in
August 2004,
unveiled a new credit-rating model that Wall Street banks used to
sow the seeds of their own demise. The formula allowed securities
firms to sell more top-rated, subprime mortgage-backed bonds than
ever before. A week later, Standard & Poor's moved to revise its
own methods. An S&P executive urged colleagues to adjust rating
requirements for securities backed by commercial properties
169

OECD, Bank Competition, supra note, at 25.
Ibid 26; see also Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report (US GPO 2011) 210.
171
Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, ‘How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit
Ratings?’ (2011) 101 J of Fin Econ 493, 494-95.
170
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because of the “threat of losing deals.” The world's two largest
bond-analysis providers repeatedly eased their standards as they
pursued profits from structured investment pools sold by their
clients, according to company documents, e-mails and interviews
with more than 50 Wall Street professionals. It amounted to a
“market-share war where criteria were relaxed,” says former S&P
Managing Director Richard Gugliada. 172
As one Moody’s executive testified, “The threat of losing business to a
competitor, even if not realized, absolutely tilted the balance away from an
independent arbiter of risk towards a captive facilitator of risk capture.”173
Investment banks, if they did not get the desired rating, threatened to take
their business elsewhere. 174 The ratings agencies, intent on increasing
market share in this growing, highly profitable sector, complied. As the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found, Moody’s alone rated nearly
45,000 mortgage-related securities as AAA. 175 In contrast, only six privatesector companies were rated AAA in early 2010. 176
In 2006 alone, Moody’s put its triple-A stamp of approval on 30
mortgage-related securities every working day. The results were
disastrous: 83% of the mortgage securities rated triple-A that year
ultimately were downgraded. 177
Even in the staid world of corporate bonds, increased competition
among the ratings agencies led to a worse outcome.

One empirical

economic study looked at corporate bond and issuer ratings between the
mid-1990s and mid-2000s. During this period, Fitch Ratings shook up the
S&P/Moody’s duopoly by substantially increasing its share of corporate
172

Elliot Blair Smith, ‘”Race to Bottom’ at Moody's, S&P Secured Subprime's Boom,
Bust’
Bloomberg
(25
Sept.
2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ax3vfya_Vtdo.
173
FCIC Report, supra note, at 210.
174
Ibid.
175
Ibid xxv.
176
Ibid.
177
Ibid.
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bond ratings. 178 It was Moody’s and S&P’s policy to rate essentially all
taxable corporate bonds publicly issued in the U.S. So Moody’s and S&P,
under their policy, should have had little incentive to inflate their ratings for
corporate bonds: “even if an issuer refuses to pay for a rating, the raters
publish it anyway as an unsolicited rating and thereby compromise any
potential advantage of ratings shopping.” 179 But even here, as competition
intensified, ratings quality for corporate bonds and issuers deteriorated with
more AAA ratings by S&P and Moody’s, and greater inability of the ratings
to explain bond yields and predict defaults. 180
Consequently, increased competition among the ratings agencies, rather
than improve ratings quality, reduced quality to society’s detriment. The
authors of the ratings study concluded that “competition most likely
weakens reputational incentives for providing quality in the ratings industry
and, thereby, undermines quality. The reputational mechanism appears to
work best at modest levels of competition.” 181 It is now the subject of
lawsuits. 182

178

Becker & Milbourn, supra note, at 494 (“In the median industry, Fitch issued less
than one in ten ratings in 1997, but approximately a third of ratings by 2007.”).
179
Ibid 498.
180
Ibid 496, 513 (“A one standard deviation increase in Fitch’s market share is
predicted to increase the average firm and bond rating by between a tenth and half of a step
(and increases it significantly more for more highly levered firms). Moving from the 25th
to the 75th percentile of our competition measure reduces the conditional correlation
between ratings and bond yields by about a third and reduces the conditional predictive
power for default events at a three-year horizon by two-thirds.”).
181
Becker & Milbourn, supra note, at 499.
182
In re Lehman Bros Mortgage-Backed Sec Litig 650 F 3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2011)
(complaint alleging that by “play[ing] the [rating] agencies off one another” and choosing
the agency offering the highest percentage of AAA certificates with the least amount of
credit enhancements, the banks purportedly “engender[ed] a race to the bottom in terms of
rating quality”); In re Bear Stearns Mortg Pass-Through Certificates Litig 08 CIV. 8093
LTS KNF, 2012 WL 1076216 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (complaint alleging that
“[c]ompounding the problem, banks such as Bear Stearns shopped for Rating Agencies
willing to assign their securities top credit ratings, pitting the Agencies against each other
and provoking a race to the bottom in rating quality”).
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2. Automotive Emissions Testing Centers
Another recent economic study empirically tested whether increasing
competition among New York’s vehicle emissions testing centers led to a
worse outcome--namely testing centers improperly passing vehicles “to
garner more consumer loyalty for delivering to consumers what they want:
a passing Smog Check result.” 183
In New York, like other states, automobile owners must have their
vehicles periodically tested for pollution control. Owners can choose which
private testing center to check their auto’s compliance with the
environmental emission standards. In this market, the government fixed the
price of emission testing. So the testing centers competed along nonprice
dimensions (such as quick testing and passing vehicles that otherwise
should flunk). 184 Car owners could retest any failing car at another facility.
Moreover, car owners received a one-year waiver if they spent $450 and the
vehicle continued to fail. “With these limitations, the short-term benefit of
failing a vehicle pales in comparison to the long-term benefit of retaining
the customer’s service and repair business.” 185
Competition among these emissions testing centers, the study found,
“can induce firms to increase quality for their customers in ways that are
both illegal and socially costly.” 186 In examining 28,002,043 emissions tests
from 11,425 New York automobile emissions testing facilities, the study
found that as the number of competitors increased in the local automobile
emissions market, so too did the pass rates for cars. 187 It was highly

183

Victor Manuel Bennett, Lamar Pierce, Jason A Snyder, & Michael W Toffel,
‘Customer-Driven Misconduct: How Competition Corrupts Business Practices’ (2013)
Management Science. In press, draft available at www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-071.pdf 3.
184
Ibid 9.
185
Ibid 8.
186
Ibid 2.
187
Ibid 3.
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unlikely, the study found, that vehicle differences explained these higher
pass rates.

Rather increasing competition produced significantly “more

illicit leniency only for those cars for which test results are easiest to
manipulate.” 188 Honest testing sites risked losing business to dishonest
competitors:
Under such pressure, firms that strictly follow legal rules may lose
considerable market share as customers flee to more lax firms.
When competition increases the threat of customer loss, firms are
more likely to respond by matching their rivals’ behavior and
crossing legal boundaries. 189
Antitrust typically treats entrants as superheroes in deterring or
defeating the exercise of market power. Here entrants, the study found,
were likelier the villains.

New vehicle testing entrants with limited

customer bases were “more likely than incumbents to be lenient in the face
of competition.” 190 Entrants, rather than remedy market failure, contributed
to it. 191
The study’s authors concluded with a contrarian view on competition:
Policy makers must consider whether competition is the ideal
market structure when corruption, fraud, or other unethical
behaviors yield competitive advantages. If customers indeed
demand illicit dimensions of quality, firms may feel compelled to
cross ethical and legal boundaries simply to survive, often in
response to the unethical behavior of just a few of their rivals. In
markets with such potential, concentration with abnormally high
188

Ibid 3.
Ibid 5.
190
Ibid 3 & 15 (finding “that, while incumbents’ pass rates increase in the face of
competition (b = 0.073, p < 0.05), entrants’ pass rates respond even more strongly (b =
0.220, p < 0.01). While an entrant’s pass rate is 0.96 percentage points lower than other
facilities when entering a market without an incumbent, it rises dramatically as the number
of proximate facilities increases. These results suggest that while new entrants may on
average be more reluctant to provide illicit quality to customers, their willingness increases
when trying to win new customers in more competitive markets.”).
191
Ibid 3.
189
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prices and rents may be preferable, given the reduced prevalence
of corruption. 192
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court recognized that competition could increase vice.
But equating “competition with deception, like the similar equation with
safety hazards,” was for the Court “simply too broad.” 193 The Court was
willing to assume that “competition is not entirely conducive to ethical
behavior” but that was “not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for
doing away with competition.” 194 The Court was unwilling to support “a
defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.” 195
This Article agrees that a “ruinous competition” defense is
premature.

The economic literature has not developed a sufficient

analytical framework for courts and agencies to apply, consistent with the
rule of law, a ruinous competition defense. 196 Antitrust officials should
continue to advocate competition and challenge private and public anticompetitive restraints.
But competition, while often good, is not always good.

The

economic literature draws into question the competition official’s traditional
remedy of more competition. The literature should prompt competition
officials to inquire when competition promotes behavioral exploitation,
unethical behavior, and misery. Some may fear this weakens competition
advocacy, as rent-seekers will use the exceptions described herein to restrict
192

Ibid 19.
Nat'l Soc of Prof'l Engineers v US 435 US 679, 696 (1978).
194
Ibid.
195
Ibid.
196
This Article examines the initial issue of whether competition is always good.
Separate issues are whether the suboptimal competition should be regulated, when, and by
whom. Nor is it necessarily superior that independent agencies or courts (rather than
elected officials) determine which industries get a ruinous defense, when, and under what
circumstances. Society may prefer that the more publicly accountable elected officials,
despite the risk of rent-seeking, should decide when competition is suboptimal.
193
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socially beneficial competition. But to effectively advocate competition,
officials must understand when more competition is the problem, not the
cure. In better understanding these instances when competition does more
harm than good, antitrust officials can more effectively debunk claims of
“ruinous competition.”

By undertaking this inquiry, antitrust officials

become smarter and better advocates.
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